

Navigating Nordic discontent

Regional divides, electoral trends,
and the green transition

A PROJECT SYNTHESIS

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This publication is also available online in a web-accessible version at:
<https://pub.nordregio.org/pb-2025-18-navigating-nordic-discontent>

1. Introduction

Over the last decade, feelings of being left behind have grown in some regions in Europe and other Western countries. Trust in elected representatives and government institutions has declined in parts of the Western world, and the liberal democratic model appears to have come under dispute (Galston 2018, Berman 2021). This dissatisfaction may be expressed through protests and changes in voting behaviour. Recent research indicates that political discontent in Europe is more pronounced outside urban centres. The emergence of so-called "geographies of discontent" has been linked to economic stagnation and decline as well as inequalities between regions, both real and perceived (Rodríguez-Pose 2018, Florida 2021, Rhodes-Purdy et al. 2023).

The Nordic countries have not been immune to the rise in political discontent experienced in Western countries (Palonen and Sunnercrantz 2021, Chilvers et al. 2024). However, to our knowledge, there has been no systematic study of whether and how increasing rural-urban divides in living conditions play a role in creating discontent in the Nordic Region. This project synthesis aims to contribute by summarizing new research findings on this topic. The research has been carried out as part of the project *"Moving together or drifting apart? Rural-urban differences in socio-economic development and public support for the green transition"*, conducted by Nordregio on behalf of the Nordic Council of Ministers. It was the goal of the project to explore whether geographies of discontent exist in the Nordic Region and to analyse the contextual factors that may shape discontent, including the role of the green transition.

The project has been based on a review of the academic literature and has analysed spatial differences in the Nordic Region regarding demographic, social and economic factors. Regression analyses have examined links between the socio-demographic and economic contexts in which people live and their voting behaviour. To complement these findings and deepen the understanding of local discourses, a limited number of interviews with civil servants from Nordic municipalities have been conducted. Several reports and academic outputs based on this work have already been published or are forthcoming (Chilvers et al. 2024, Tapia et al. 2024, Dzhavatova et al. 2025, Tapia, forthcoming).

In the remainder of this project synthesis, we summarize findings from across the various project publications. The synthesis also presents key messages and recommendations to Nordic policymakers on how to address discontent and its drivers in the Nordic Region going forward.



2. What is political discontent and how can it be measured?

Political discontent, also known as 'political dissatisfaction' or 'distrust,' is a complex concept that is difficult to measure and lacks a universally accepted definition. We define political discontent as a sense of dissatisfaction that individuals feel towards their government (Chilvers et al. 2024).

Political discontent can be considered a characteristic of a healthy democracy, as it implies that citizens critically reflect on policies or decision-making processes and may express their disagreement in various ways. Nonetheless, political discontent has been discussed as challenging for Western democracies in recent years, for several reasons: First, if political discontent persists, it may lead to declining trust in political institutions and leaders. For example, abstaining from voting may indicate that citizens have lost faith or interest in democratic processes or feel alienated from political leaders. Such an erosion of trust can undermine the legitimacy and functioning of democratic institutions. Second, political discontent can contribute to polarization in society. If some groups support the existing order while others become dissatisfied, these divisions can create barriers to dialogue, negotiation and compromise on which democratic governance relies. Additionally, discontent can increase support for political actors and movements that promise to disrupt established institutions, norms or processes, with potentially wide-ranging repercussions for societies and economies (Norris 2011, Inglehart and Norris 2016, Jennings et al. 2016).

To better understand how discontent manifests, Hirschman (1970) developed the influential 'Exit-Voice-Loyalty' model. This model identifies different ways in which discontent can be expressed, including voter realignment ('exit'), where individuals switch their support from one party to another, protest ('voice'), or passive endurance in the hope that the situation will improve ('loyalty'). Later users of the model have added a fourth dimension, 'neglect,' which implies that individuals will abstain from voting (de Ruyter et al. 2021).

While voter turnout has declined in many Western countries over the last two decades, the rise in votes cast for non-traditional and populist parties is often seen as the most distinct expression of political discontent (Solijonov 2016, Rodríguez-Pose 2020). For example, Inglehart and Norris (2016) found that the average share of populist parties in national and European parliamentary elections increased from 5.1% in the 1960s to 13.2% in the 2010s in Europe. Many recent studies have therefore analyzed discontent through votes cast for populist parties (Rodríguez-Pose 2018, Berman 2021, Rhodes-Purdy et al. 2023). It is not straightforward to define populism and populist parties. Here, we use a definition from the PopuList Project (Rooduijn et al. 2024), which we will revisit later (see Section 4). It defines populist parties based on Mudde (2004) as "*parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people*".

It is important to note that electoral behaviour alone cannot provide a full understanding of political discontent and its drivers. Discontent and distrust are complex feelings that can arise from various sources, and voting data alone cannot reveal their specific nature or causes (van Vulpen et al. 2023). For example, citizens may hold different levels of trust or discontent towards political actors at different levels of governance or different parts of the political system, and it is not straightforward how this translates into electoral choices (Vilhelmsdóttir 2020). Moreover, not all discontent may be expressed through voting, and not all votes for populist parties necessarily represent protest votes. Voters of these parties may support a specific candidate or the general values or priorities that the parties promote. Due to these limitations, scholars have also used other data sources, such as surveys or social media, to analyse and understand discontent (Denti and Faggian 2021, Kenny and Luca 2021).

When considering the Nordic Region, however, voting data remain the best available proxy to analyse and discuss political discontent. These data are reliable and complete, available at the local level, and comparable across the Nordic countries. Therefore, in our project, we have used local-level voting data from national elections as a proxy to investigate political discontent and its drivers, focusing on turnout and votes cast for populist parties.

Related project publication:

Chilvers, M., Sánchez Gassen, N., Lundgren, A. and Tapia C. (2024): Geographies of discontent in the Nordic Region? A conceptual overview. Nordregio Working Paper 2024:1, Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1862660/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.



3. What are potential drivers of public discontent in Europe and other Western countries, according to the literature?

In recent years, many studies have explored the reasons behind public discontent in Europe and other Western countries. The causes appear to be varied and complex, with several factors identified as potential contributors (Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2023, O'Brien and Leichenko 2003, De Ruyter et al. 2021).

- **Economic factors:** Some studies suggest that increasing economic insecurity is contributing to discontent in Western democracies. Since the 1980s, changes such as automation, the rise of the knowledge economy, globalization, and neo-liberal austerity policies have challenged the postwar era, which was characterised by class-based political parties and efforts to achieve full employment, decent salaries and stable jobs. While higher educated, mobile groups have benefited more from new opportunities and higher incomes, workers in some traditional industries have faced growing job insecurity, stagnant or declining wages, and higher risks of unemployment (Guiso et al. 2017, Sandbu 2020). Nonetheless, evidence for the economic explanation is mixed, and some studies have found that it is not necessarily the poorest and most vulnerable groups who express discontent but rather middle-class voters. Some experts have argued that discontent among these groups may be fuelled by worries about wealth and status decline rather than de-facto deprivation (van Prooijen 2021).

- **Spatial inequalities:** The socio-economic challenges mentioned above have not affected all areas equally. Some regions in Western countries have experienced more pronounced impacts than others. The decline of traditional industries has led to higher levels of unemployment, lower incomes and stagnation in these areas, contributing to outmigration trends. Based on this line of research, it has been argued that growing spatial inequalities between regions have contributed to the formation of discontent in areas that are stagnating or falling behind. These areas, where feelings of being left behind and neglected are particularly strong, have been referred to as “geographies of discontent” in the literature (Koeppen et al. 2021, de Ruyter et al. 2021). Recent publications have nuanced this argument and highlighted that discontent does not necessarily emerge in the poorest places but rather in areas that have experienced the strongest relative decline or where residents worry about future economic decline (McKay et al. 2024, Rodríguez-Pose 2018).

In the Nordic Region, according to the Territorial Cohesion Development Index, peripheral regions have fallen behind urban areas in Denmark, Finland and Sweden during the 2010s. However, this was not the case in Norway or the Åland Islands (Rauhut and Marques da Costa 2021, Knudsen 2020). The latter two countries have developed relatively successful regional policies to support rural areas. In Iceland, the fact that over two-thirds of the population live in the Reykjavik city-region makes the country particularly vulnerable to urban economic dominance over rural areas.

- **Socio-cultural factors:** Some scholars have argued that discontent cannot be solely explained by economic factors. The “cultural backlash thesis” suggests that a deeper cultural divide has occurred within the West, resulting in a backlash against progressive cultural change (Inglehart and Norris 2016). In postwar western societies, when immediate material needs such as food, shelter and existential security were increasingly met, a shift towards post-material values such as self-fulfillment, independence, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism occurred. The expansion of education and empowerment of women have further nourished those new values and identities (Ford and Jennings 2020). Such movements, however, have triggered a backlash among once more predominant and privileged members of the population, who feel threatened by the change in cultural values, actively reject those progressive values and criticize the decline in more traditional norms and customs (Inglehart and Norris 2016).
- **Demographic factors:** These cultural factors can be reinforced by demographic trends. Urban centres often offer a wider range of educational and employment opportunities, particularly attracting young individuals who move to these areas for education and jobs, including in the Nordics. The migration of such groups to cities leads to increasing age and socio-economic disparities, as well as differences in value systems between rural and urban areas. Cities tend to host younger, more highly educated populations that often also hold more liberal values. Additionally, cities usually have higher shares of international migrants,

contributing to more diverse value systems in those areas. Demographic processes may therefore deepen economic, social and cultural divides between areas (Kenny and Luca 2021, Larsson et al. 2021).

- **Decline in public services:** Rural-urban migration trends make it more challenging to uphold healthcare, education, public transport and other public services in rural and remote areas, which may fuel discontent. Service provision in the Nordic Region is partly reliant on local tax revenue. If local populations decline, public actors may struggle to find the funds to cover service needs. That financial struggle is made worse by challenging geographical circumstances such as long distances to services and older age structures than in urban areas. Lower wages mean that rural areas have difficulties attracting skilled workers for the public service sector. Many rural areas therefore have higher than average income tax rates to cover the costs, while the availability of services often remains lower than in urban areas. Trends to digitalize, privatize or centralize public services in larger towns or cities in order to cut costs have further contributed to a thinning out of services in rural areas, and contributed to discontent (Eriksson and Tollefsen 2022, Björling and Rönnblom 2023, Slätmo et al. 2023, Lundåsen 2024).
- **The role of immigration:** During the last decade, European countries (including the Nordics) have received large numbers of refugees and migrants from other parts of the world. Recent literature has found evidence that migrants, especially when they arrive in large numbers, can serve as a catalyst to channel disappointment and fears of economic insecurity (Dijkstra et al. 2020 and references therein). The timing of immigration and the origin, skill level and number of migrants appear to be critical in fuelling concerns that newcomers might take away jobs, diminish wages and/or put pressure on welfare systems (Larsson et al. 2021, Edo et al. 2019, Dehdari 2022). High levels of sudden immigration have also been shown to trigger a fear among groups of native-born citizens that their culture and community are under threat and that newcomers will dilute national or regional identity and traditional values (Alesina and Tabellini 2020).
- **Green investments:** Finally, in the interviews conducted with local civil servants for this project, the green transition was mentioned as a potential source of discontent. Interviewees stressed that the green transition can create many new opportunities and benefits for Nordic municipalities. Nonetheless, several also mentioned that discontent has arisen in areas where, for example, wind energy farms, biogas plants or solar panels are constructed. Discontent can arise if local residents feel that they have not been sufficiently involved in the planning of such projects or do not fully understand the process. According to the interviewees, people living in the direct proximity of wind parks also become dissatisfied with changes in the landscape or if they see the value of their property decline due to the installations. In more remote and island communities, concern has been expressed that the electrification of public transport can lead to higher prices, slower traveling speed and fewer connections.

The question how these and other factors interlink to create discontent is still intensely debated in academic research (Koeppen et al. 2021, Mascherini et al. 2023). Since the causes and drivers of discontent are multiple and complex, the level and expression of discontent can also vary over time and across different regions. In the following sections, we will turn to the Nordic Region and explore expressions and possible causes of discontent in this context.

Related project publication:

Chilvers, M., Sánchez Gassen, N., Lundgren, A. and Tapia C. (2024): Geographies of discontent in the Nordic Region? A conceptual overview. Nordregio Working Paper 2024:1, Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1862660/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.



4. Can we identify geographies of discontent in the Nordic Region?

Similar to other European countries, the Nordic countries have experienced changes in electoral behaviour over the past decades (Martinez-Toledano and Sodano 2021). In this section, we describe trends in voter turnout and support for populist parties in the Nordic countries, highlighting spatial variations within each country. We distinguish between urban, intermediate and rural municipalities based on a Nordic rural-urban typology developed by Nordregio (see Box 1 and Annex 1 for more detailed information).

Box 1: Nordregio's rural-urban typology

The urban-rural territorial typology is a new system for classifying Nordic territories into seven distinct categories: inner urban areas, outer urban areas, peri-urban areas, local centres in rural areas, rural areas close to urban areas, rural heartland areas, and sparsely populated rural areas. These categories are based on different degrees of urbanity and rurality. The typology is based on a 1 x 1 km grid system that enables the classification of different types of areas at a detailed territorial level.

Nordregio and Ubigu developed this typology as a new analytical framework to combine different types of data and facilitate a more nuanced understanding of territorial differences across the Nordic countries. The typology includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Åland. Due to data limitations, it was not possible to include Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

A recent report by Stjernberg et al. (2024) presents the Nordic typology, along with analyses of territorial and settlement patterns. The typology has also been published [online](#) as an interactive digital web-mapping platform, which allows users to zoom in on different areas.

For this policy brief, we use an aggregated version of the typology which groups the seven types of areas into three categories:

1. **Urban municipalities:** Includes municipalities classified as inner urban and outer urban areas.
2. **Intermediate municipalities:** Includes municipalities classified as peri-urban areas, rural areas close to urban areas and some local centres in rural areas.
3. **Rural municipalities:** Includes municipalities classified as rural heartland areas, sparsely populated rural areas and some local centres in rural areas.

Annex 1 provides more information.

In line with Hirschman's 'Exit-Voice-Loyalty' model and its later extensions (see section 2), low voter turnout can be considered as a sign of alienation or indifference towards democratic processes and, therefore, an indicator for discontent (Eypórssón and Önnudóttir 2017). When considering Europe as a whole, voter turnout has declined since the mid-1980s (Solijonov 2016), but as Figure 1 shows, trends have varied across the Nordic Region.

In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, turnout in national-level elections has fluctuated over time and does not display a clear downward trend. In Finland, turnout reached a high point of 85% during the national-level elections of 1962 and 1966, subsequently declining to 65% in 1999. Since then, turnout has stabilized between 65% and 69%. Iceland and Greenland are the only countries where a clearer recent downward trend in turnout can be observed. In Iceland, turnout has successively declined from a level of around 90% in the mid-1980s to 80% in the most recent elections. In Greenland, turnout declined from around 75% in the 1980s and mid-1990s to 66% in the elections of 2021. In the most recent elections shown in Figure 1, the highest voter turnouts were in the Faroe Islands (89.4%), Sweden (84.2%), Denmark (84.2%) and Iceland (80.1%). Lower participation rates were found in Norway (77.2%), Finland (68.5%), and Greenland (65.9%).

The voter turnout trends shown in Figure 1 hide significant spatial differences within the Nordic countries. This perspective is added in Figure 2, which shows voter turnout in recent national-level elections in each municipality as a percentage point relative to the national average, highlighting differences in participation levels across the Nordic Region. This method removes inter-country differences in participation levels, providing a clearer view of spatial differences. Areas shaded in blue indicate regions where voter turnout exceeded the national average, while red areas represent regions where turnout was below average.




Figure 1: Turnout in national-level elections (1945-2024)

Source: IDEA (n.d.)

The map in Figure 2 reveals that urban areas and municipalities near major cities generally showed higher turnout, as seen in the metropolitan areas of Finland and Norway, where turnout generally surpassed the national average. In contrast, rural and sparsely populated areas, particularly in northern Norway, Sweden and Finland, displayed lower voter engagement. Nonetheless, exceptions exist. The inner urban areas of Stockholm and Malmö, as well as some municipalities close to the capital cities, such as Botkyrka (Stockholm) in Sweden and Vantaa (Helsinki) in Finland, had low turnout. Conversely, several rural areas showed higher-than-average turnout. For example, many rural municipalities in southwestern Norway and Ostrobothnia in Finland had among the highest turnout rates in their country. Denmark, Greenland and Iceland exhibit mixed patterns, with some rural areas demonstrating strong voter engagement while others fall below average.

Statistical analyses^[1] reveal that, when considering the Nordic Region as a whole, urban areas have higher turnout rates than rural areas, with intermediate areas (including peri-urban areas and rural areas close to urban areas) falling in between. These differences are statistically significant at $p \leq 0.0001$. If low voter turnout is interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction and/or indifference towards democratic processes, it appears that people living in rural areas more strongly show such signs of discontent than their counterparts living urban centers and intermediate municipalities. Nonetheless, additional factors may play a role in explaining turnout, such as socioeconomic characteristics or the decisiveness of elections (Pattie et al. 2025, Stockemer 2017).

1. The results of the statistical analysis are not shown here but available upon request.

Next, we can consider votes cast for populist parties. To identify such parties in the Nordic Region, we rely on a classification provided by the PopuList project (Rooduijn et al. 2024). This project offers a list of European parties that can be categorized as populist, far-left, and/or far-right. It has been peer-reviewed by approximately 100 academics and has been used in over 600 academic publications (Rooduijn et al. 2023). According to the PopuList project, the following Nordic parties can be considered populist: the Danish Peoples Party and the New Right in Denmark, the Movement Now and the Finns Party in Finland, the Progress Party, the Red Party and Coastal Party in Norway, and the Sweden Democrats in Sweden. In Iceland, the Centre Party, the People's Party, the Civic Movement and Icelandic Socialist Party are classified as populist. However, since different indicators and data for statistical analyses were not available for Iceland (see section 6), this country was not included in further analyses in our project.

Figure 3 shows the percentage of votes that populist parties have obtained in national-level elections in the Nordic countries over the last 15 years.




Figure 3: Share of votes cast for populist parties in Nordic national-level elections (2009-2023)

Source: Statistics Sweden [ME0104B6], SSB, [08092], Statistics Denmark [FVPANDEL], Statistics Finland [13sw].

Note: The following Nordic parties are considered populist, based on the PopuList project (Rooduijn et al. 2023): the Danish Peoples Party and the New Right in Denmark, the Movement Now and the Finns Party in Finland, the Progress Party, the Red Party and Coastal Party in Norway, and the Sweden Democrats in Sweden.

In Finland, the 2011 election saw the breakthrough of the Finns Party, when it achieved 19.1% of the votes. Similar election results were achieved in 2015 when the party joined the coalition government under Prime Minister Juha Sipilä. The party achieved around 18% of the votes during elections in 2017 and 2019 and then reached their strongest result in the parliamentary elections of 2023 with around 20% of the votes, making it the second strongest party. The Movement Now party achieved around 2.3% of the votes during parliamentary elections in 2019 and 2023. (Salo 2022)

In Norway, the Progress Party achieved its best election result in 2009, winning close to 23% of the votes in the national parliamentary elections. In 2013, the Social Democrats, who had held power for eight years, lost the parliamentary elections to a centre-right coalition. The Progress Party entered government for the first time as part of the coalition, marking a turning point in the party's electoral success (Bjerkem 2016). During the latest elections in 2021, the Progress party obtained close to 12% of the votes, less than the 15% it had obtained in 2017. The Red party and the Coastal Party, also classified as populist by the PopuList project, are smaller parties that achieved less than 5% of the votes in the most recent elections.

In Sweden, the 2010 election is often viewed as a turning point, as the Sweden Democrats entered parliament for the first time with 5.7% of the votes. The 2014 election saw them double their share of the vote to 13%, which meant that none of the traditional political blocs was able to form a majority. In the 2022 election, they reached 20.5% (Jylhä et al. 2019). Finally, election behaviour has proven slightly more complex in Denmark. The Danish People's Party garnered 21% of the vote in 2015, with most of its support coming from rural areas. By the 2019 elections, however, the party's agenda had been partly adopted by other parties, and the People's Party lost support. The New Right is a smaller party that achieved less than 4% of the votes during the most recent national-level elections (Sørensen and Svendsen 2023).

Overall, in the four Nordic countries, only Sweden saw a consistent increase in the share of votes cast for populist parties during the 15-year period considered here. In Finland, a noticeable increase in the populist vote share was only evident in the most recent election. In Norway and Denmark, the populist vote share has declined in recent elections, in the case of Denmark after a high in the national elections of 2015. These national-level trends again mask considerable diversity in voting behaviour at the local level.

Figure 4 shows the percentage of votes cast for populist parties in recent national-level elections, compared to the national average. At the regional level, above-average support for populist parties is prevalent in most parts of Sweden and Finland, except for areas such as Österbotten in Finland and Gotland, Stockholm, and Västerbotten in Sweden, where support falls below national averages. Southern Sweden, especially Skåne and Blekinge, shows strong backing for populist parties. In Finland, urban regions like Uusimaa demonstrate lower populist support compared to Satakunta and Etelä-Pohjanmaa. Denmark displays a more balanced distribution, with stronger populist support in southern regions like Syddanmark and lower support in urbanized areas around Copenhagen and Aarhus. In Norway, rural and coastal regions such as Møre og Romsdal and Nordland show stronger populist support, while urban centers like Oslo and Vestland exhibit below-average backing.




Figure 4: Votes for populist parties in national level elections (2023 or latest election before this year)

Note: The map compares the share of votes cast for populist parties in national elections in each municipality to the nation-wide average. Municipalities highlighted in blue are those have below-average votes for populist parties; municipalities in red are above average. Based on the PopuList project, the following parties are classified as populist: The Danish Peoples Party and the New Right (Denmark), Movement Now and the Finns Party (Finland), Progress Party, Red Party and Coastal Party (Norway) and the Sweden Democrats (Sweden). pp in the map legend stands for percentage points.

Statistical analyses^[2] show that, overall in the Nordic Region, the percentage of votes cast for populist parties in recent national-level elections is highest in intermediate municipalities, which includes peri-urban municipalities, rural areas close to urban areas, and local centres in rural areas. Both rural and urban municipalities have lower shares of votes cast for populist parties. These differences are statistically significant at $p \leq 0.0001$. In the rural areas, however, there are some outliers where the share of votes cast for populist parties is very high (up to 50%). Overall, if votes cast for populist parties are interpreted as a sign for political discontent, it appears that people in intermediate municipalities show the highest levels of discontent in the Nordic Region.

In both cases, whether considering voter turnout or votes cast for populist parties, people living in urban areas appear to show the lowest levels of public discontent as expressed through electoral behaviour.

Related project publication:

Chilvers, M., Sánchez Gassen, N., Lundgren, A. and Tapia C. (2024): Geographies of discontent in the Nordic Region? A conceptual overview. Nordregio Working Paper 2024:1, Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1862660/FULLTEXT01.pdf>

2. The results of the statistical analysis are not shown here but available upon request.



5. How unequal is the Nordic Region?

An increase in socio-demographic and economic inequalities is often mentioned as a cause of political discontent (see section 3). There is evidence in all Nordic countries of economic, social, and demographic divergence between urban and rural areas (Norlén et al. 2024). Country-specific studies suggest that such inequalities may contribute to discontent in the Nordic Region, but more comprehensive, region-wide studies are needed (Stein et al. 2021, Erlingsson et al. 2023).

Against this backdrop, we analyzed long-term income inequality trends within the Nordic countries and self-governing territories between 2005 and 2022 (Tapia et al. 2004). Using income data from national statistical institutes (NSIs), our analysis provides insights into distribution patterns and development trajectories of income inequalities. The study confirms a widening gap in household income at the Nordic level. Across periods of economic expansion and downturn, income dispersion has shown moderate growth within most regions.

Our analysis shows that the increasing income inequality is driven by both social and spatial factors. The analysis reveals a significant increase in income disparities between different income groups across all municipalities in the Nordic Region (social inequality). Trends are more varied regarding spatial inequality, with some municipalities having seen a growth in income disparity while others have seen declines. Decomposition techniques further revealed that social inequality remains the main driver of inequalities within the Nordic Region, although spatial factors are becoming more important in countries like Finland and the Faroe Islands.

We also examined the relationship between average household income at the municipal level and income inequality levels within those municipalities. The results show a generally positive association between these two variables, but the relationship varies significantly across different countries, territories, and spatial contexts. Specifically, higher density urban areas often show a stronger link between average income and income inequality compared to more rural regions.

Norway stands out as an exception. Although income inequality has been increasing there too, income distribution at the municipal level is still generally more equal than other Nordic countries and regions. This indicates a more socially cohesive and spatially balanced society in Norway compared to its peers. Norway's regional and rural development policies could serve as a source of inspiration for policy implementation across the Nordic Region.

In addition to long-term developments in income inequality, the project also analysed current spatial differences in the Nordic Region using a wider range of demographic, social and economic indicators (Dzhavatova et al. 2025). These indicators measure population ageing, gender balance, the share of foreign residents, educational attainment, unemployment, household income, sectoral employment changes, greenhouse gas emissions, and the availability of green jobs at local and regional level. The indicators were chosen to reflect the factors discussed in the academic literature as drivers of discontent (see section 3).

Overall, our analyses show that that urban, intermediate and rural areas in the Nordic Region differ significantly in demographic, social, and economic aspects, with urban areas being advantaged in several respects. For example, urban municipalities usually have younger, more educated populations with a more balanced gender ratio. Households in urban municipalities also tend to have higher incomes. Additionally, urban economies register lower greenhouse gas emissions per employee and more green jobs.

In contrast, many rural areas face various demographic and socio-economic challenges, including ageing populations, a less balanced gender composition, higher greenhouse gas emissions per employee and lower household incomes. However, rural municipalities have strengths as well. For example, they show lower levels of income inequality than urban areas and may therefore be considered more socially cohesive. In addition, in 2022, unemployment levels were lower in rural than in urban areas in many Nordic countries, with Finland being a notable exception. Intermediate areas lie between urban and rural regions based on the indicators considered here.

Related project publications:

Dzhavatova, K., Sánchez Gassen, N., Tapia, C., Sonesson, M., Norlén, G. & Berbert Bruno, K. (2025). Nordic Spatial Variations in Demographic, Social, and Economic Characteristics: A Visual Guide. Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://nordregio.org/publications/nordic-spatial-variations>

Tapia, C., Dzhavatova, K., Norlén, G., Chilvers, M., Lundgren, A. & Sánchez Gassen, N. (2024). Moving together or drifting apart? Territorial differences in household wealth across the Nordic Region. Nordregio Working Paper 2024:2, Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://nordregio.org/publications/moving-together-or-drifting-apart/>



6. Exploring the spatial determinants of voting behaviour

Based on an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis, we have examined the factors influencing the likelihood of voting for populist parties in national elections across Nordic municipalities. As detailed in Section 4, Nordic parties were classified as populist according to the well-established PopuList classification (Rooduijn et al. 2024). Box 2 outlines the social, economic, demographic, and territorial variables considered in the analysis. Most of these variables are described in Section 5, where a spatial analysis revealed significant rural-urban differences for almost all of them. Additionally, the analysis includes variables indicating the presence of polluting facilities in or around municipalities. The study covers 1,013 municipalities in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden^[3], using standardized variables at the municipal level as predictors. All indicators were collected at the municipal (LAU2) level, except variables informing on the sectoral composition of employment, which are only available at the regional (NUTS-3) level.

Box 2: Independent variables considered in the regression analysis

1. **Green transition indicators:** Share of green-task jobs (2022), greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per employee in tonnes of CO₂eq per person employed, presence of facilities included in the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) in the municipality and within a 25-km radius. (Source: own, based on classification by Vona et al. (2019) and on National GHG inventories and employment by sector.)
2. **Electoral participation:** Voting turnout for national elections, 2022 or latest election. (Source: own, based on data from NSIs and classification of populist parties in PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2024))

3. Iceland was not included because of lack of municipal data for several explanatory factors.

3. **Territorial diversity:** Urban-rural category based on the seven class, population-based Nordic urban-rural typology, reference year: 2022. (Source: own, based on data from NSIs and Eurostat. For information on the typology, see Annex 1 and Stjernberg et al. (2024))
4. **Demographic and compositional factors:** Population aged 60 and over, gender ratio (male to female) and share of foreign-born individuals in the total population (2011-2022). (Source: own, based on data from NSIs.)
5. **Educational attainment:** Share of population with tertiary education as the highest level of educational attainment (2011-2022). (Source: own, based on data from NSIs.)
6. **Employment evolution and structure:** Sectoral distribution of employment by economic sector (NACE, lev. 1) and rolling average of the change rate for the previous four years (Source: ARDECO database and own, based on ARDECO database). Unemployment rate for ages 20-64 (2011-2022). (Source: own, based on data from NSIs.)
7. **Household income and inequality:** Equivalised household income and rolling average of the change rate for the previous four years, and Gini coefficient on equivalised household income (2011-2022). (Source: own, based on data from NSIs.)

All variables are numeric, except for territorial diversity and the presence of polluting facilities, which are categorical. Numeric variables were standardized before fitting the model to ensure comparability.

The results of the analysis indicate that several predictors are significantly associated with the propensity to vote for a populist party.

Green transition factors

Higher levels of green task jobs in a municipality do not seem to be significantly associated with the proportion of vote for a populist political option. Nonetheless, municipalities with high levels of GHG emissions per employee show a smaller percentage of votes for populist parties. Such a negative association between populist voting and GHG emissions is further corroborated by the presence of polluting EPRT^[4] facilities within municipalities or nearby areas, which is also negatively and significantly associated with populist vote share.

4. The European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (EPRT^R) Regulation requires facilities that exceed certain thresholds to report their pollutant emissions every year, starting in 2007. The Regulation specifies reporting thresholds for 91 different substances that have been classified as pollutants. Facilities which that meet or exceed the threshold for any of these pollutants are required to register their emissions.

These somewhat surprising patterns might be related to existing working conditions in communities with prevalence of traditional industrial activities. In the Nordic context, where renewable energy sources dominate the energy production landscape, the majority of industrial emissions originate from traditional industrial facilities. These facilities are predominantly found in industries such as cement production, steel manufacturing, and the chemical industry. Emissions in these sectors are often characterised as difficult-to-abate, meaning they are challenging to reduce or eliminate using current technologies and practices. This is due to the inherent nature of the production processes involved, which often rely on high-temperature processes, chemical reactions, and the use of fossil fuels as feedstocks or energy sources (Kumar et al. 2024).

Industries in these sectors are often major local employers, providing jobs not only in the production process but also in supporting services like maintenance, transportation, and administration (Ostermeyer 2023). They source goods and services from local suppliers, which can have a positive impact on the local economy, and generate significant tax revenue for local municipalities, supporting public services and infrastructure. The industries can have a multiplier effect on the local economy, as employees spend their wages locally, supporting other businesses and services (Moritz et al. 2017). Additionally, compared to other activities, the cement, steel, and chemical industries in the Nordic countries tend to offer higher wages, more comprehensive benefits packages, greater job security, and more opportunities for professional advancement (Marginson & Dølvik 2020).

Building on these considerations, we hypothesize that indirect factors may contribute to strengthening local communities and reducing perceptions of economic insecurity, which are often drivers of populist sentiment. This interpretation might explain why the presence of large industrial facilities in a municipality, often leading to greater GHG intensity of local employment, is often concurrent with a smaller percentage of votes for populist parties in those areas, as workers are more likely to feel invested in the existing economic and social order. By providing a sense of stability and security to local communities, traditional industries may indirectly reduce the appeal of populist movements, which can find momentum in feelings of economic anxiety and disillusionment with current development. Further research would be needed to delve deeper into these mechanisms and confirm whether the presence of large, traditional industries in the Nordic municipalities does in fact contribute to reduce the level of political discontent at the local level.

Other factors and controls

- **Electoral participation:** The results reveal a significant negative correlation between voter turnout and populist voting. This implies that greater electoral participation seems to be associated with a lower propensity to vote for a populist party.
- **Territorial diversity:** The analysis highlights the influence of the degree of urbanization on populist vote share. Municipalities categorised as intermediate – including peri-urban areas, rural areas close to urban areas and local centres in rural areas – show significantly higher populist voting compared to urban cores and remote rural areas.

- **Demographic and compositional factors:** Demographic factors significantly affect voting for a populist party. Municipalities with a higher proportion of men relative to women exhibit a stronger propensity toward populist voting. When controlling for other factors, the share of the foreign-born population does not seem to be significantly associated with the propensity to vote for populist parties in the Nordic context, while the share of the population aged 60 years and over shows a negative coefficient, but is only marginally significant.
- **Educational attainment:** Educational attainment is a relevant predictor of populist vote. A higher share of individuals with tertiary education as their highest educational attainment is strongly associated with a lower propensity to vote for populist parties. This implies that municipalities with an overrepresentation of individuals with less than tertiary education tend to cast higher share of votes for populist parties.
- **Employment structure and unemployment:** A higher municipal unemployment rate is strongly associated with a greater propensity to vote for a populist party. This suggests that greater job insecurity and economic uncertainty may drive individuals towards populist political alternatives. In terms of economic specialization, a higher proportion of employment in mining, manufacturing and construction seems to be positively associated with populist vote. However, the evolution of job distribution across economic sectors shows a very weak association with voting for a populist party. This suggests that, at a Nordic level, the stability of the sectoral composition of employment does not have any significant effect on the propensity to vote for a populist party.
- **Household income and inequality:** There seems to be a weakly positive and non-significant correlation between average equivalised household income in Nordic municipalities and voting for a populist party in national elections. Income inequality at municipal level does not seem to be an important factor either. However, the rolling average of the change rate in equivalized household income for the previous four years is negatively associated with higher populist vote share. This suggests that the evolution of household income, rather than the current level of economic affluence, influences populist voting.

Overall, the regression findings suggest that the causes and drivers of discontent expressed as voting for populist parties are multiple and complex. Territorial and demographic factors, labour market conditions and educational aspects significantly influence voters' preferences for populist parties in the Nordic Region. Additionally, green transition factors play a role in voting for populist parties. The model's reasonable predictive power of data collected at the municipal level supports the notion that all these dimensions are important determinants of discontent and populist voting in the Nordic Region.

Related project publication:

Tapia, C. et al. (forthcoming). Mapping the uneven landscape of Nordic discontent: From regional disparities to the green transition.



7. Are there rural-urban differences in attitudes towards the green transition?

The preceding section highlighted a potential link between the green transition and public discontent. Areas with a higher number of green jobs show increased support for populist parties, while people in municipalities with traditional polluting industries are less likely to vote for these parties. This finding raises questions about the attitudes of people in the Nordic Region towards the green transition, including their expectations and concerns. Are there spatial differences in Nordic residents' attitudes?

A survey conducted by Nordregio in October-November 2022 provides insights into these questions (Tapia et al. 2023). The survey included a representative sample of the adult population living in the Nordic Region, covering five countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and three autonomous regions (Åland, Greenland and Faroe Islands). The survey involved 5,178 telephone interviews, with respondents randomly selected to ensure representative gender and age quotas.

The survey results show that perceptions and attitudes towards climate change and the green transition vary among people living in urban, intermediate and rural areas in the Nordic Region (Figure 5). People living in cities are more likely to view climate change as a serious or very serious problem (82%), compared to those living in small towns and suburbs (68%) and rural areas (62%). Similarly, a majority of city dwellers support investing more public financial resources in preventing climate change, even if it means that taxes are raised (59%). This support is lower among residents of small towns and suburbs (47%) and rural areas (39%). These differences are statistically significant.




Figure 5: Attitudes towards climate change and ambitious green transition policies by degree of urbanization (2022)

Source: Tapia et al. (2023).

The survey also reveals significant attitudinal differences towards climate policies and the green transition among residents in urban, intermediate and rural areas:

- **Worries about job loss:** Urban residents are less concerned about job losses due to the green transition (22% of respondents) compared to those in intermediate (30%) and rural areas (31%).
- **Worries about price increases:** Less than half (46%) of survey respondents in urban areas expect prices and the cost of living to rise due to the green transition. Their counterparts living in intermediate or rural areas were more concerned about such effects (54% in each of these groups).
- **Expectations about more sustainable lifestyles:** Survey respondents in urban, intermediate and rural areas also differ with respect to potential positive impacts from the green transition. Urban residents are more likely to expect that the green transition will lead to more sustainable lifestyles in the area where they live (60%). Respondents in intermediate areas (46%) and rural areas (40%) are less likely to expect such impacts.
- **Perceptions about unequal impacts:** Residents in urban, intermediate and rural areas also differ in their perceptions about how the green transition affects people in the Nordic Region. When asked if the green transition affects everyone equally, regardless of income, 60% of urban residents disagree, but only 54% of residents in towns and suburbs and 53% of rural dwellers do. Similarly, when asked if everyone in the Nordic Region is equally affected by the green transition, regardless of living in urban or rural areas, 60% of urban residents disagree. Among those in intermediate areas, 53% disagree, and among rural dwellers, 55% do. Thus, urban residents are more likely to perceive the green transition as having unequal impacts compared to their counterparts in intermediate and rural areas.

Overall, the survey results indicate that urban residents are more concerned about climate change and more willing to support ambitious climate policies than people living in towns, suburbs and rural areas. They are also less worried about green transition impacts on jobs and prices, although they more readily acknowledge that the green transition may have unequal effects on people. In contrast, residents in intermediate and rural areas are more concerned about job loss and rising cost of living and are less likely to support ambitious climate policies.

Related project publication:

Tapia, C., Sánchez Gassen, N. & Lundgren, A. (2023). In all fairness: perceptions of climate policies and the green transition in the Nordic Region. Nordregio Report 2023:5. Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://www.nordregio.org/publications/in-all-fairness-perceptions-of-climate-policies-and-the-green-transition-in-the-nordic-region/>



8. Summary and recommendations

During the last few years, concerns have been raised that political discontent can pose a challenge to Western democracies. Discontent may reflect declining trust in political leaders and democratic processes and may lead to increased societal polarization or political instability. As discussed in this project synthesis, discontent can stem from various factors, including economic insecurities, spatial inequalities, demographic shifts and social factors. Large socio-technical changes like the green transition may also play a role. Discontent can be directed towards different political actors, institutions at different levels of government, and individual policies. It can manifest in different forms, such as protests, political apathy or changing party support.

This complexity makes it challenging to identify the concrete drivers of discontent and formulate strategies of how to address them. We have analysed political discontent through the lens of electoral behaviour – turnout in national level elections and votes cast for populist parties. This approach has allowed us to examine the association between socio-economic characteristics and voting patterns at the municipal level across the Nordic Region.

Our analyses show that neither turnout nor the share of votes cast for populist parties have consistently increased across the Nordic countries in recent years. Exceptions include Sweden, where the Sweden Democrats have gained increasing support among voters over the past 15 years, as well as Greenland and Iceland, which have witnessed declines in voter turnout. Nonetheless, these national-level trends mask considerable diversity at local level. A comparison between rural, intermediate and urban municipalities showed that rural areas have significantly lower levels of voter turnout, while people living in intermediate areas are significantly more likely to vote for populist parties.

In this project synthesis, we have also summarized our research findings regarding the drivers of these spatial differences. Our analyses show that significant spatial inequalities exist in the Nordic Region, with urban municipalities generally benefitting from more favourable demographic, social and economic conditions. The results show that these inequalities matter for populist voting. For example, people who live in municipalities with a higher proportion of men compared to women, lower levels of education, higher levels of

unemployment, and less favourable income developments are more likely to vote for populist parties. By contrast, the presence of a traditional, polluting industrial facility and higher levels of GHG emissions per employee are associated with lower support for populist parties. This has implications for the further advancement of the green transition, which we return to below.

These results have implications for policy makers seeking to address political discontent. The following recommendations are targeted towards national, regional and local policymakers in the Nordic Region. They focus on the underlying factors contributing to political discontent and suggest approaches to reduce spatial inequalities, enhance economic development, improve local quality of life and promote participation:

1. **Reduce territorial disparities**
2. **Ensure that green jobs are high-quality jobs**
3. **Invest in attractive communities**
4. **Strengthen public-service provision**
5. **Strengthen citizen participation in policy making**
6. **Promote electoral participation**

1. Reduce territorial disparities

Discontent is higher in municipalities experiencing higher levels of unemployment and income stagnation. This underscores the importance of continuing to implement and finance regional and place-based development policies that enhance regional economic competitiveness and growth, and reduce territorial disparities, with a focus on stagnating and declining regions. Strengthening local networks between companies, research and innovation actors and the educational sector may also spur local and regional innovation and entrepreneurship.

More research findings and recommendations:

Salonen, H. (2024): Roadmap for Nordic rural development, Stockholm: Nordregio.

Available at: <https://nordregio.org/publications/roadmap-for-nordic-rural-development/>

2. Ensure that green jobs are high-quality jobs

Our research shows that political discontent, as expressed in voting for populist parties, is lower in municipalities with high levels of greenhouse gas emission per employee and/or a polluting facility than in municipalities without these characteristics. We have hypothesized that traditional heavy industries have often offered stable jobs with comparatively high wages and generous benefits to employees and have benefitted local

economies by sourcing goods and services from local suppliers. This may have contributed to maintain high levels of stability and trust.

These results point to the importance of maintaining good working conditions during the green transition. Green investments and initiatives that lead to job creation should strive to offer similar rights and benefits as jobs in traditional industries. Temporary jobs with low pay and little benefit for local communities will not be sufficient to counteract discontent in vulnerable areas and might even increase it.

Consequently, new green jobs should offer good overall working conditions, such as employment security, opportunities for development, and decent pay. It is equally important that local communities benefit from green investments in the long run, through job opportunities for local residents and multiplier effects in local economies. Investing in re-skilling and up-skilling programmes is important to ensure that local workers and employees can update their competencies to qualify for new jobs.

Additional research, using both quantitative and qualitative approaches, are needed to delve deeper into the relationship between jobs, working conditions and discontent and to fully understand the patterns observed in our analyses.

More research findings and recommendations:

Sánchez Gassen, N. et al. (2024): Nordic toolbox for a just green transition. Stockholm:

Nordregio. Available at: <http://doi.org/10.6027/R2024:21.1403-2503>

See in particular the priority area on *reskilling and upskilling*.

3. Invest in attractive communities

Political discontent is higher in municipalities with a higher proportion of men relative to women. Skewed gender balances are often caused by the outmigration of young women to large urban centers that offer more varied education and employment opportunities. However, the profiles of the local labour markets also play a role. In many remote areas, economic activity centres around male-dominated sectors such as agriculture, forestry or mining, which offer better employment opportunities for men.

In a recent project, Nordic youth representatives suggested 40 action points to make rural regions more attractive for both men and women and to increase young people's willingness to stay (Wøien Meijer et al. 2023). Their recommendations include investing in accessible and efficient transportation, affordable housing options, accessible education opportunities, remote work options, recreational facilities, public meeting spaces, health and welfare services and increasing opportunities for involvement. The overall goal of investments should be to create better quality of life and opportunities for all, thereby reducing outmigration and even attract new residents. Investing in local community development is hence seen as a win-win policy option that can contribute to reinforce local community resilience and reduce the degree of public discontent in those areas.

More research findings and recommendations:

Wøien Meijer, M. et al. (2023): From fields to futures: 40 action points for rural revitalisation. Nordic Rural Youth Panel 2023. Nordregio Report 2023:13. Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://nordregio.org/publications/from-fields-to-futures-40-action-points-for-rural-revitalisation/>

4. Strengthen public service provision

An important component of creating and maintaining attractive communities is ensuring that public services are available to local populations. During interviews conducted in our project, local civil servants highlighted the importance of maintaining local services to ensure a high quality of life. They also stressed how the downscaling of healthcare, education, or public transport has increased place-based resentment among residents. In times of scarce financial resources, concentrating services in larger towns may be considered a fiscal necessity, but it implies risks of fuelling discontent. Declining service provision in local areas also challenges goals such as limiting outmigration and attracting newcomers.

In contrast, investing and maintaining local public health care services, education, social care and public administration in rural and remote areas can help to attract young families and women, as these sectors have female-dominated workforces. It is also important to strike the right balance between providing place-based public services and using digital technologies such as telemedicine, online education or digital public service portals.

More research findings and recommendations:

Slätmo, E. et al. (2023): Service provision and access to services in Nordic rural areas. Nordregio report 2023:2, Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://nordregio.org/publications/service-provision-and-access-to-services-in-nordic-rural-areas/>

Bogason, A. & Slätmo, E. (2023): Essential Service Provision and Access to Services in Nordic Rural Areas. Nordregio policy brief 2023:1, Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://nordregio.org/publications/essential-service-provision-and-access-to-services-in-nordic-rural-areas/>

5. Strengthen citizen participation in policy making

In interviews conducted for this project, civil servants stressed the importance of maintaining a close dialogue with their citizens. Openly communicating about local issues and developments, offering opportunities for citizen participation and genuinely listening to people's concerns and ideas can help build trust and contribute to the development of better policies. This may be particularly relevant for projects and initiatives related to the green transition, master and physical planning, and infrastructure development. Importantly, the involvement of citizens should not be limited to the final stages of policy-making processes but should occur early on so that their input can still make a difference.

More research findings and recommendations:

Salonen, H. (2024): Between hand-outs and stand-outs: Opportunities for policy support for just green transitions. Nordregio Policy Brief 2024:1. Stockholm: Nordregio. Available at: <https://nordregio.org/publications/between-hand-outs-and-stand-outs-opportunities-for-policy-support-for-just-green-transitions/>

6. Promote electoral participation

Finally, local and regional authorities could examine whether obstacles hinder people from participating in elections. This may include accessibility issues or lack of knowledge on how to vote remotely. Information and voter awareness campaigns targeting young people, marginalized populations, and other groups with low turnout can encourage more people to exercise their right to vote. This can foster a more inclusive political environment and ensure that voting results are more representative.

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
Annex 1: Nordic urban-rural typology

This visual guide classifies Nordic municipalities as urban, intermediate and rural based on a typology developed by Nordregio (Stjernberg et al. 2024). The typology is based on 1 x 1 km grid statistical data on population, building density and land-use intensity derived from CORINE land-cover data. The typology distinguishes between the following seven classes based on an area's degree of urbanity and rurality, ranging from inner urban areas to sparsely populated rural areas:

- **Inner urban areas** are the most densely populated parts of urban cores. Urban cores are clustered cells summing up to at least 15,000 inhabitants, and these are divided into Inner and Outer urban areas based on density criteria (population density and building floor space).
- **Outer urban areas** are the least densely populated parts of urban cores. Urban core areas are clustered cells with at least 15,000 inhabitants, and these are divided into Inner and Outer urban areas based on a density criteria (population density and building floorspace).
- **Peri-urban areas** are intermediate zones between urban cores and the rural. They are based on generalized travel-time estimates from the edges of outer urban areas (6 min travel-time zones) and smaller urban settlement (4-6 min travel-time zones).
- **Local centers in rural areas** are population centers located outside urban areas, including small towns and large parish villages, where population is between 5,000-14,999 inhabitants.
- **Rural areas close to urban areas** have a rural character and are functionally connected and close to urban areas. On average, this means a 20-30 minute driving time from the edge of outer urban areas.
- **Rural heartland.** These are rural areas with intensive land use, with a relatively dense population and a diverse economic structure at the local level. Most of the agricultural land is in this class.
- **Sparsely populated rural areas** are areas with dispersed small settlements that are located far from each other. Land cover usually consists of forests, mountains, or natural grassland.

Figure A displays a map of the Nordic Region, highlighting the classification of all municipalities. Note that Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not included in the typology due to lack of data.

Figure A: Nordic urban-rural typology



This policy brief uses a simplified version of the typology to facilitate comparisons. The seven classes have been merged into three – urban areas, intermediate areas and rural areas – in the following way:

Combined Nordic typology classes	Detailed Nordic typology classes
Urban areas	• Inner urban areas • Outer urban areas
Intermediate areas	• Peri-urban areas • Rural areas close to urban areas • Local centres in rural areas
Rural areas	• Local centres in rural areas • Rural heartland areas • Sparsely populated rural areas

About this publication

Navigating Nordic discontent

– **Regional divides, electoral trends, and the green transition**

A PROJECT SYNTHESIS

Nora Sánchez Gassen, Carlos Tapiá, Myriam Chilvers, Kamila Dzhavatova, and Anna Lundgren

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